Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2060984
 
 

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Consumer Welfare Implications of Regulating Rent-to-Own Transactions


Howard Beales


George Washington University - School of Business

Jeffrey A. Eisenach


American Enterprise Institute; NERA Economic Consulting

Robert E. Litan


Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation; AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies

May 16, 2012


Abstract:     
In this study, we analyze the consumer welfare implications of regulating Rent-to-Own (RTO) transactions. We conclude that the benefits and costs of mandatory disclosure and labeling regulations currently imposed by most states are likely small, and that the effects of imposing a Federal baseline for such regulations would also be relatively small. On the other hand, we conclude that regulations imposed by a handful of states which treat RTO agreements as credit sales, or directly regulate RTO prices, substantially reduce consumer welfare, and should be repealed.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52


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Date posted: May 18, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Beales, Howard and Eisenach, Jeffrey A. and Litan, Robert E., Consumer Welfare Implications of Regulating Rent-to-Own Transactions (May 16, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2060984 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2060984

Contact Information

Howard Beales
George Washington University - School of Business ( email )
Washington, DC 20052
United States
Jeffrey A. Eisenach (Contact Author)
American Enterprise Institute ( email )
1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States
NERA Economic Consulting
1255 23rd Street, NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20037
United States
202-466-3510 (Phone)
202-466-3605 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.nera.com
Robert E. Litan
Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation ( email )
4801 Rockhill Road
Kansas City, MO 64110
United States
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies
1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
United States
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