Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis

46 Pages Posted: 17 May 2012 Last revised: 22 Sep 2015

See all articles by William H. Page

William H. Page

University of Florida Levin College of Law

Date Written: May 17, 2012


Antitrust remedies -- criminal and civil, public and private, penalties and injunctions -- are supposed to “eliminate the effects of the illegal conduct” and “restore competition.” In pursuing these goals, courts and enforcers are guided by the standard of economic efficiency and by certain assumptions about the relative capabilities of markets and regulators. A substantial literature now examines the optimal use of antitrust remedies in specific contexts or for specific offenses to achieve economic efficiency. In this essay, I draw on these studies to develop an integrated, albeit schematic, account of how courts and agencies might optimally deploy the various remedies to deter or enjoin collusive and exclusionary practices.

Keywords: antitrust, optimal deterrence, antitrust damages, injunctions, criminal penalties

JEL Classification: K21, K42, L40, L41

Suggested Citation

Page, William Hepburn, Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis (May 17, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061791 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2061791

William Hepburn Page (Contact Author)

University of Florida Levin College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States

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