46 Pages Posted: 17 May 2012 Last revised: 22 Sep 2015
Date Written: May 17, 2012
Antitrust remedies -- criminal and civil, public and private, penalties and injunctions -- are supposed to “eliminate the effects of the illegal conduct” and “restore competition.” In pursuing these goals, courts and enforcers are guided by the standard of economic efficiency and by certain assumptions about the relative capabilities of markets and regulators. A substantial literature now examines the optimal use of antitrust remedies in specific contexts or for specific offenses to achieve economic efficiency. In this essay, I draw on these studies to develop an integrated, albeit schematic, account of how courts and agencies might optimally deploy the various remedies to deter or enjoin collusive and exclusionary practices.
Keywords: antitrust, optimal deterrence, antitrust damages, injunctions, criminal penalties
JEL Classification: K21, K42, L40, L41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation