Coordination in Political Machinery Under Dictatorship: Signals, Shirking, and Repression

21 Pages Posted: 18 May 2012

See all articles by Gregory V. Kalyagin

Gregory V. Kalyagin

Lomonosov Moscow State University - Economic Department; Moscow State University - Faculty of Economics

Vladimir Kozlov

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Date Written: May 18, 2012

Abstract

This paper is devoted to the explanation of selected bureaus’ behavior patterns in the soviet type of totalitarian dictatorships with the command economic model. It is a proven fact that the plan figures in the soviet economy were fabricated as a consequence of intrigues and secret negotiations between different interested parties. Generally, bureaus, as rational agents that minimize risk and maximize slack, should have been interested in reducing the plan figures, nevertheless, they strived to increase them. As examples, mass repression under dictatorships and overexpenditure of an administrative leverage at elections in non-democratic and quasi-democratic countries can be observed. In the article we develop a simple model of coordination between principal (dictator) and his agents (bureaus), which explain the mentioned paradoxical situation.

Keywords: Dictatorship, Stalinism, Repression, Plan, Coordination problem

JEL Classification: P00, P26, N44, D73

Suggested Citation

Kalyagin, Gregory V. and Kozlov, Vladimir, Coordination in Political Machinery Under Dictatorship: Signals, Shirking, and Repression (May 18, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2062354 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2062354

Gregory V. Kalyagin

Lomonosov Moscow State University - Economic Department ( email )

SP-1, Leninskie Gory
Moscow, 119991
Russia

Moscow State University - Faculty of Economics ( email )

1-46 Leninskiye Gory
Moscow, 119991
Russia

Vladimir Kozlov (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

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