Misinformation
International Economic Review, Forthcoming
55 Pages Posted: 19 May 2012
There are 2 versions of this paper
Misinformation
Misinformation
Date Written: 2011
Abstract
A candidate for political office has private information about his and his rival's qualifications. A more informative positive (negative) campaign generates a more accurate public signal about his own (his rival's) qualifications, but costs more. A high type candidate has a comparative advantage in negative campaigns if, relative to the low type, he can lower the voter's belief about his rival more effectively than he can raise her belief about himself; and vice versa. In equilibrium, this comparative advantage determines whether the high type chooses a positive or negative campaign. Further, competition helps the high type separate.
Keywords: Positive and negative campaign, informativeness, least cost separation
JEL Classification: D72, D82, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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