Unilateral Appointments of Arbitrators: Perverse Incentives in International Arbitration?
Latin American and the Caribbean Law and Economics Association Annual Conference, XVI edition
Posted: 21 May 2012
Date Written: May 20, 2012
The proper constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal will determine the validity and enforceability of an award. This paper deals with the different problematics that multi arbitrator tribunals, in specific those panels formed under the scheme of party appointed arbitrators can face during the proceedings, analyzing the possibility of reducing the perverse incentives that an arbitrator might have in ruling in favor of his nominating party.
Keywords: Arbitration, Arbitrator, Constitution of Arbitral Tribunal, Arbitral Tribunal, Unilateral Appointments, Duty of Disclosure, Award, Enforcement of Awards, Law and Economics, Perverse Incentives, Incentives, L&E
JEL Classification: K4, K00, K10, L19, K20, K29, K30, K33, K39, K40, K41, K49
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation