The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations

47 Pages Posted: 23 May 2000  

Stijn Claessens

Bank for International Settlements; University of Amsterdam - Finance Group; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Tinbergen Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Simeon Djankov

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics

Larry H.P. Lang

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance

Date Written: November 23, 1999

Abstract

We examine the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries. In all countries, voting rights frequently exceed cash-flow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings. The separation of ownership and control is most pronounced among family-controlled firms and small firms. More than two-thirds of firms are controlled by a single shareholder. Managers of closely held firms tend to be relatives of the controlling shareholder's family. Older firms are generally family-controlled, dispelling the notion that ownership becomes dispersed over time. Finally, significant corporate wealth in East Asia is concentrated among a few families.

JEL Classification: G34

Suggested Citation

Claessens, Stijn and Djankov, Simeon and Lang, Larry H.P., The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations (November 23, 1999). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=206448 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.206448

Stijn Claessens

Bank for International Settlements ( email )

Centralbahnplatz 2
CH-4002 Basel
Switzerland

University of Amsterdam - Finance Group ( email )

Roetersstraat 18
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 20 525 6020 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5285 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.fee.uva.nl/fm/index.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Tinbergen Institute

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Simeon Djankov (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )

1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Hsien Ping Larry Lang

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance ( email )

Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
+85 2 2609 7761 (Phone)
+85 2 2603 6586 (Fax)

Paper statistics

Downloads
3,121
Rank
2,500
Abstract Views
8,629