Europe 2020 and National Reforms: Economic Governance and Structural Reforms

45 Pages Posted: 23 May 2012

Date Written: April 27, 2012

Abstract

Structural reforms are stressed in Europe 2020 as a tool for boosting economic growth and improving social cohesion. Yet tensions often arises between country specificities and goals, on one side, and pressures by partners and EU wide goals on the other side. The paper discusses the European economic governance issues building upon a sketchy historical account of the so called Open Method of Coordination. It is argued that the structural reforms’ success depends upon aspects like the variety, ex ante identifiability and easiness to organize of their potential supporters as well as the presence of institutional mechanisms through which it is possible to compensate the potential losers and/or distributing on wider and fairer basis their benefits; furthermore mechanisms capable to contrast the shortsightedness of many political decisions, also favouring the political participation of all often silent stakeholders, are argued as essential. The most important contribution from EU wide pressures and rules is identified in the capacity building of national institution, to be based also upon stringent rules, aiming at fostering national governments’ accountability and the policy evaluation tools.

Note: Downloadable document is in Italian.

Keywords: structural reforms, economic governance, EU2020, open method of coordination

JEL Classification: F55, H79, O43

Suggested Citation

Sestito, Paolo and Torrini, Roberto, Europe 2020 and National Reforms: Economic Governance and Structural Reforms (April 27, 2012). Bank of Italy Occasional Paper No. 124, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2064687 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2064687

Paolo Sestito (Contact Author)

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184
Italy

Roberto Torrini

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184
Italy

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