International Tax Competition: Zero Tax Rate at the Top Re-Established

31 Pages Posted: 24 May 2012

See all articles by Tomer Blumkin

Tomer Blumkin

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Efraim Sadka

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Yotam Shem-Tov

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics

Date Written: May 24, 2012

Abstract

In this paper we extend the zero tax at the top result obtained in the closed economy case with bounded skill distributions for the case of unbounded skill distributions in the presence of international labor mobility and tax competition. We show that in the equilibrium for the tax competition game the optimal marginal income tax rate converges to zero as the income level tends to infinity. We further show in simulations that the zero marginal tax result is not a local property: over a large range at the higher end of the income distribution, the optimal tax is approximately given by a lump-sum tax set at its Laffer rate. We further show that the range in which the optimal marginal tax is approximately set to zero is widening as migration costs decrease.

Keywords: tax competition, migration, zero marginal tax at the top

JEL Classification: D600, H200, H500

Suggested Citation

Blumkin, Tomer and Sadka, Efraim and Shem-Tov, Yotam, International Tax Competition: Zero Tax Rate at the Top Re-Established (May 24, 2012). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3820. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2065710

Tomer Blumkin (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+972 8 647 2268 (Phone)
+972 8 647 2941 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Efraim Sadka

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 640 9712 (Phone)
+972 3 642 8074 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Yotam Shem-Tov

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

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