Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay Auctions

28 Pages Posted: 25 May 2012

See all articles by Ella Segev

Ella Segev

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of IE&M

Aner Sela

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: April 2012

Abstract

We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the sub-game perfect equilibrium of these multi-stage sequential all-pay contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants, their types, and their order on the expected highest effort.

Keywords: All-pay auctions, Sequential contests

JEL Classification: D44

Suggested Citation

Segev, Ella and Sela, Aner, Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay Auctions (April 2012). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8949, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2066322

Ella Segev (Contact Author)

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of IE&M ( email )

1 Ben-Gurion Blvd
Beer Sheva, 84105
Israel

Aner Sela

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+972 8 647 2309 (Phone)
+972 8 647 2941 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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