Elections in China

63 Pages Posted: 25 May 2012

See all articles by Monica Martinez-Bravo

Monica Martinez-Bravo

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Gerard Padró i Miquel

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Nancy Qian

Yale University - Department of Economics

Yang Yao

Peking University - China Center for Economic Research (CCER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2012

Abstract

We examine the effects of introducing village elections on public goods expenditures, income distribution and land use in rural China. We construct a large panel data set of village administrative records to document the history of political reforms and economic policies for over two hundred villages. We exploit the staggered timing of the introduction of village elections to find that elections significantly increased public goods expenditure financed by villagers. In addition, we find that the introduction of elections caused a moderate decline in income inequality and likely reduced corruption. The results suggest that local officials are better controlled by local elections rather than by centrally managed bureaucratic monitoring.

Suggested Citation

Martinez-Bravo, Monica and Padro i Miquel, Gerard and Qian, Nancy and Yao, Yang, Elections in China (May 2012). NBER Working Paper No. w18101. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2066399

Monica Martinez-Bravo (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Gerard Padro i Miquel

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Nancy Qian

Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States

Yang Yao

Peking University - China Center for Economic Research (CCER) ( email )

Beijing, 100871
China

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