The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying

28 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 1997

See all articles by Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters

Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters

Tilburg University - CentER

Frans van Winden

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: January, 1996

Abstract

This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informed sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder. We compare the behavior of two subjects pools: 143 undergraduate students and 30 public affairs officials that are professionally familiar with strategic information transmission. The experiments comprised two parameter treatments: one with low costs for sending messages, and one with high costs. Our main conclusion is that there are neither significant nor systematic differences in the behavior of the two subject- pools.

JEL Classification: C70, C93

Suggested Citation

Potters, Johannes (Jan) J. M. and van Winden, Frans, The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying (January, 1996). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2067 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2067

Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - CentER ( email )

Department of Economics
P.O. Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 8204 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

Frans Van Winden

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) ( email )

Roetersstraat 18
CREED
Amsterdam 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 20 525 4126 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5283 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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