Constitutional Problems of Multilevel Judicial Governance in Trade and Investment Regulation
EUI Working Papers LAW No. 2012/08
35 Pages Posted: 29 May 2012
Date Written: March 1, 2012
This lecture, delivered at Copenhagen Business School on 18 November 2011, examines the legal and constitutional methodologies underlying private commercial arbitration, national, regional and worldwide adjudication in trade and investment regulation with a particular focus on ‘multilevel judicial governance’ inside the European Union (EU) relating to international agreements concluded by the EU and/or its member states. It explains the need for methodological legal constitutionalism in terms of theories of justice and human rights and emphasizes the customary law requirement of interpreting treaties, and settling disputes, ‘in conformity with principles of justice’, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Due to the ‘dual nature’ of modern legal systems as positive law including ‘principles of justice’, judges and ‘courts of justice’ must define their ‘constitutional functions’ of ‘administering justice’ with due regard to procedural and substantive human rights and other ‘principles of justice’. The particular context of European and international economic law (IEL) calls for interpreting the 5 competing conceptions of IEL not only in terms of Westphalian conceptions of ‘public international law among sovereign states’, ‘global administrative law’, multilevel economic regulation and international commercial and ‘conflicts law’, but also as part of multilevel constitutional rules based on respect for legitimate ‘constitutional pluralism’ aimed at protecting transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens. Arguably, both human rights and the ‘rule of law’ requirements of EU law justify ‘cosmopolitan conceptions’ of IEL protecting transnational rule of law and limiting arbitrary violations of EU law and IEL by EU institutions and member states.
Keywords: commercial arbitration, trade and investment law, European Union
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