Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment Among Students and Clerical Workers
Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 828
43 Pages Posted: 29 May 2012
Date Written: May 28, 2012
We study individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly faced with the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategies adopted, and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers, and cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior with decentralized punishment and also personal punishment when available.
Keywords: non-standard subject pools, prisoner’s dilemma, personal punishment, artefactual field experiment, stranger matching
JEL Classification: C90, C70, D80
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation