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Electoral Accountability and Inter-district Externalities

28 Pages Posted: 29 May 2012 Last revised: 2 Mar 2016

Galina Zudenkova

University of Mannheim

Date Written: November 2015

Abstract

This paper analyzes a multidistrict game of electoral accountability in which constituencies compete over scarce resources by setting expectations for targeted spending. I build a political agency model in which a vote-maximizing politician is subject to the oversight of distinct constituencies. The voters' demand for targeted spending in these constituencies is driven down by the competition among them. I characterize the unique equilibrium of this game. In order to make their constituency an attractive choice for discretionary spending, the voters adopt reelection standards below what they receive in equilibrium. They therefore tend to be satisfied with the distributive politics of the incumbent politician. The incumbent is then quite likely to win more than half of the votes.

Keywords: Electoral Accountability; Targeted spending; Political agency

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Zudenkova, Galina, Electoral Accountability and Inter-district Externalities (November 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2069977 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2069977

Galina Zudenkova (Contact Author)

University of Mannheim ( email )

Universitaetsbibliothek Mannheim
Zeitschriftenabteilung
Mannheim, 68131
Germany

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