Long-Term Budgetary Implications of Tax-Favoured Private Pension Schemes

24 Pages Posted: 31 May 2012

See all articles by Pablo Antolin

Pablo Antolin

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD

Alain de Serres

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) - Economics Department (ECO)

Christine de la Maisonneuve

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) - Economics Department (ECO)

Date Written: April 1, 2004

Abstract

This paper provides estimates of the implicit fiscal assets as well as of the evolution over time of fiscal costs and revenues related to tax-favoured retirement saving regimes in 17 OECD countries, taking into account current and future contributions, asset accumulation and withdrawals, all of which will be strongly influenced by future demographic developments. The main results show that in the case where tax incentives are assumed to lead essentially to saving diversion rather than creation, the net budgetary cost of tax-favoured schemes would remain large, despite the sharp rise in revenues collected from withdrawals as population ages. The paper shows that this cost would significantly be reduced if tax-favoured schemes succeed in promoting additional private savings. It then explores a number of policy options to maximise the amount of additional saving.

Suggested Citation

Antolin, Pablo and de Serres, Alain and de la Maisonneuve, Christine, Long-Term Budgetary Implications of Tax-Favoured Private Pension Schemes (April 1, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2070654 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2070654

Pablo Antolin (Contact Author)

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD ( email )

2 rue Andre Pascal
Paris Cedex 16, MO 63108
France
33-1-45.24.90.86 (Phone)
33-1-44.30.63.08 (Fax)

Alain De Serres

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) - Economics Department (ECO) ( email )

2 rue Andre Pascal
Paris Cedex 16, MO 63108
France

Christine De la Maisonneuve

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) - Economics Department (ECO) ( email )

2 rue Andre Pascal
Paris Cedex 16, MO 63108
France

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