Education and the Quality of Government

40 Pages Posted: 3 Jun 2012 Last revised: 6 Jul 2022

See all articles by Juan Carlos Botero

Juan Carlos Botero

Pontifica Universidad Javeriana Law School

Alejandro Ponce

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Alejandro Ponce

The World Justice Project

Andrei Shleifer

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: June 2012

Abstract

Generally speaking, better educated countries have better governments, an empirical regularity that holds in both dictatorships and democracies. We suggest that a possible reason for this fact is that educated people are more likely to complain about misconduct by government officials, so that, even when each complaint is unlikely to succeed, more frequent complaints encourage better behavior from officials. Newly assembled individual-level survey data from the World Justice Project show that, within countries, better educated people are more likely to report official misconduct. The results are confirmed using other survey data on reporting crime and corruption. Citizen complaints might thus be an operative mechanism that explains the link between education and the quality of government.

Suggested Citation

Botero, Juan Carlos and Ponce, Alejandro and Ponce, Alejandro and Shleifer, Andrei, Education and the Quality of Government (June 2012). NBER Working Paper No. w18119, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2073159

Juan Carlos Botero (Contact Author)

Pontifica Universidad Javeriana Law School ( email )

Cale 40 # 6-23 piso 7
Bogotá, DC 110231
Colombia

Alejandro Ponce

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Alejandro Ponce

The World Justice Project ( email )

740 15th Street NW
Washington, DC 20005
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.worldjusticeproject.org

Andrei Shleifer

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5046 (Phone)
617-496-1708 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

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