9 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2012 Last revised: 20 Mar 2013
Date Written: March 27, 2012
Using Chhaochharia’s and Grinstein’s (JF, 2009) data and methodology, Guthrie, Sokolowsky, and Wan (JF, 2010) document that compensation committee independence leads to an increase in executive pay, and that the increase is concentrated in firms with powerful monitors. These findings stand in sharp contrast to the prediction of the managerial power hypothesis that director independence effectively curbs rent extraction in the form of excessive CEO pay. While it is tempting to reject the managerial power hypothesis, the evidence alternatively calls into question the effectiveness of director independence in corporate governance or the importance of reducing CEO pay to directors. In this addendum, we discuss these two possibilities.
Keywords: executive compensation, CEO pay, board structure, board independence, corporate governance, compensation committee, Sarbanes-Oxley Act
JEL Classification: G34, G38, J31, J33
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Guthrie, Katherine and Sokolowsky, Jan and Wan, Kam-Ming, CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited – Addendum (March 27, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2074895 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2074895
By Kevin Murphy