Community Costs? Analyzing the Contingent Association Between Internal Cohesion and External Knowledge Transfer Relationships

29 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2012 Last revised: 5 Jun 2012

See all articles by Ray Reagans

Ray Reagans

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Param Vir Singh

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business

Ramayya Krishnan

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management

Date Written: June 1, 2012

Abstract

Current theoretical arguments highlight the negative implications of cohesion in a network neighborhood for relationships with outsiders. We present argument and evidence illustrating the importance of knowledge overlap inside a neighborhood in moderating the negative internal cohesion effect. We analyzed the tendency for individuals to initiate and sustain knowledge transfer relationships in an online technical forum. Empirical results indicated that as cohesion in a neighborhood increased each member was less likely to initiate and sustain external knowledge transfer relationships. However, the magnitude of negative effect that cohesion had on external knowledge transfer relationships declined as knowledge overlap in the neighborhood increased. Our research findings clarify one condition under which increasing cohesion in a network neighborhood can be expected to undermine external knowledge transfer relationships, and therefore the extent to which the benefits created by cohesion in a neighborhood will come at the expense of relationships that provide access to resources outside the neighborhood.

Keywords: cohesion, knowledge overlap, knowledge transfer, social networks

JEL Classification: Z00

Suggested Citation

Reagans, Ray and Singh, Param Vir and Krishnan, Ramayya, Community Costs? Analyzing the Contingent Association Between Internal Cohesion and External Knowledge Transfer Relationships (June 1, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2076137 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2076137

Ray Reagans

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Param Vir Singh (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )

5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
412-268-3585 (Phone)

Ramayya Krishnan

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

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