On Price Recognition and Competition with Boundedly Rational Consumers

19 Pages Posted: 8 Jun 2012  

Vahid Mojtahed


Date Written: October 2011


We study an extension of the model of Rubinstein (1993) to two firms, competing in a market with consumers who are boundedly rational with respect to processing information. The cognitive bound forces customers to partition the price space. Rubinstein shows that a monopolist is able to earn a higher profit by exploiting consumers’ lack of processing ability. We extend his model to a duopoly, and show the Nash and Correlated equilibria of the game. We prove that in competition, whether firms choose their strategies independently or dependently, firms joint profit is lower than in a monopoly but does not vanish completely. The uncertainty regarding the consumers’ cutoff point and differences across firms’ prices impel firms to set their prices equal to the marginal cost.

Keywords: Bounded rationality, Duopoly, Pricing policy

JEL Classification: D43, C72, L13

Suggested Citation

Mojtahed, Vahid, On Price Recognition and Competition with Boundedly Rational Consumers (October 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2079612 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2079612

Vahid Mojtahed (Contact Author)


No Address Available

Paper statistics

Abstract Views