What Eludes International Agreements on Climate Change? The Economics of Global Public Goods

7 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2012

See all articles by S. Niggol Seo

S. Niggol Seo

Muaebak Institute of Global Warming Studies

Date Written: June 2012

Abstract

This paper provides an analysis of global warming policy as the provision of a global public good. Using a regional model composed of thirteen world regions, the paper shows how disparate incentives among the regions hinder a shift from a Business As Usual (BAU) policy to a Globally Optimal Policy (GOP). In the BAU scenario, there will be large variations in impacts from warming across the regions, meaning some countries have little incentive to participate in collective agreements. Under the GOP scenario, negative impacts from global warming will be significantly reduced in some regions resulting in strong incentives for these regions to press for action. The paper finds that an optimal regulation could save Europe, India, and Africa hundreds of billions of dollars per year by the end of this century, but would cause additional costs to China, Russia, Canada and the USA. Under the optimal regulatory framework, higher levels of abatement are required for developing countries, worsening the existing climate equity problem.

Keywords: climate change, global public good, regional model, non‐cooperation

Suggested Citation

Seo, S. Niggol, What Eludes International Agreements on Climate Change? The Economics of Global Public Goods (June 2012). Economic Affairs, Vol. 32, Issue 2, pp. 74-80, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2080365 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2012.02159.x

S. Niggol Seo (Contact Author)

Muaebak Institute of Global Warming Studies ( email )

Seorim-dong
Gwanak-gu
Seoul
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

HOME PAGE: http://www.muaebakinstitute.org/s.niggol-seo.html

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