Recognition in Respect of Bargaining in the United Kingdom: Collective Autonomy and Political Neutrality in Context

Exploring Collective Bargaining, B. Creighton and A. Forsyth, eds., Routledge, 2012

Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 38/2012

Posted: 11 Jun 2012

See all articles by Alan L. Bogg

Alan L. Bogg

University of Bristol

Tonia Novitz

University of Bristol - School of Law

Date Written: June 1, 2012

Abstract

Statutory recognition procedures reflect legislative choices. In collective labour relations, however, legislators never start with a blank canvas. In the UK context, the concepts of political neutrality and collective autonomy are deeply inscribed into the historical fabric of industrial relations. These concepts continue to exercise a significant influence on recent attempts to legislate for statutory union recognition – operating alongside a continuing commitment to a policy of restriction, whereby the state promotes 'responsible' trade union activity by curtailing recourse to social sanctions. It is argued that this has led to a 'failure of politics' rather than a 'failure of law' in assessing the efficacy of legal support for collective bargaining in the UK.

Keywords: Labour law, industrial relations, union recognition, trade union activity, collective bargaining

Suggested Citation

Bogg, Alan L. and Novitz, Tonia A., Recognition in Respect of Bargaining in the United Kingdom: Collective Autonomy and Political Neutrality in Context (June 1, 2012). Exploring Collective Bargaining, B. Creighton and A. Forsyth, eds., Routledge, 2012, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 38/2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2081984

Alan L. Bogg (Contact Author)

University of Bristol ( email )

WIlls Building
Queens Road
Bristol, BS8 1RJ
United Kingdom

Tonia A. Novitz

University of Bristol - School of Law ( email )

Wills Memorial Building
Queen's Road Clifton
Bristol BS8 1RJ, BS8 1RJ
United Kingdom

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