The Nature of Limited Government
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; Queen's University - Faculty of Law
June 11, 2012
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 43/2012
This paper explores moral limits on state action: their sources, character, and stringency. It explains what is special about the liberal tradition: there must be a protected sphere of action, and governments must respect legality. It argues, against Patrick Devlin, that the possible absence of absolute moral reasons against intrusion in a sphere is consistent with justified absolute positive limits on government intrusion. It argues, against John Finnis, that the fact that some associations (e.g. churches or marriages or universities) intrinsically valuable ‘common goods’ does not entitle them to immunity from government regulation. It concludes by suggesting why certain ‘natural law’ moralities have been considered unreasonably intrusive, for they neglect the significance of moral fallibility for limited government.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 33
Keywords: legitimacy, limited government, liberalism, natural law, authority, common good, fallibility, fallibilism, John Stuart Mill, Patrick Devlin, John Finnis
Date posted: June 12, 2012