Optimal Financial Integration and Security Design

Stern School of Business Working Paper No. S-00-12

31 Pages Posted: 17 Mar 2000

See all articles by Viral V. Acharya

Viral V. Acharya

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Alberto Bisin

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics; New York University (NYU) - Center for Experimental Social Science (CESS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2000

Abstract

We study two-period pure-exchange Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) economies with a given degree of incompleteness of financial markets and given degrees of restricted participation of agents in the markets.

We characterize the optimal financial asset structure and the optimal composition of traders for such economies. We identify a minimal property of the optimal financial structures which is required to 'decentralize' such structures by means of financial innovations that (i) introduce new financial assets, and/or (ii) integrate segmented markets. We give a precise characterization of the conditions under which such a property is satisfied. We find that when the nature of restricted participation in markets for trading in different assets is different, the optimal financial structure is, in general, not 'decentralizable,' and the order in which innovating intermediaries introduce the financial assets affects the optimality of financial structures.

Keywords: security design, financial integration, incomplete markets, restricted participation, CAPM

JEL Classification: D58, D52, G12

Suggested Citation

Acharya, Viral V. and Acharya, Viral V. and Bisin, Alberto, Optimal Financial Integration and Security Design (January 2000). Stern School of Business Working Paper No. S-00-12, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=208231 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.208231

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