The Role of the Manager?S Human Capital in Discretionary Disclosure

Posted: 2 Feb 2000

See all articles by Venky Nagar

Venky Nagar

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Abstract

Prior studies have characterized Verrecchias (1983) discretionary disclosure costs mainly in terms of competitive concerns. This study shows that separating the managers and the shareholders into two separate, self-interested beings also leads to disclosure costs, precluding discretionary disclosure in certain cases.

JEL Classification: G31, G32, G34, M41, M45, J33

Suggested Citation

Nagar, Venky, The Role of the Manager?S Human Capital in Discretionary Disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, Supplement, 1999. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=208273

Venky Nagar (Contact Author)

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States
734-647-3292 (Phone)
734-764-3146 (Fax)

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