Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2083645
 


 



Market Reactions to European Merger Regulation: A Reexamination of the Protectionism Hypothesis


Nihat Aktas


WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Eric de Bodt


Université de Lille

Marieke Delanghe


Univ. Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School

Richard Roll


California Institute of Technology

December 5, 2011

29th International Conference of the French Finance Association (AFFI) 2012

Abstract:     
In the 1990s, European merger regulation (EMR) was biased against foreign acquirers, especially if the deal harmed domestic rivals (i.e., protectionism). In 2002, the Court of First Instance overturned three prohibitions by the European Commission (EC) and criticized its economic analysis. These events hastened EMR reform, including amendments introduced in May 2004. With a sample of 474 merger proposals submitted to the EC during 1990–2007, we show that the EC’s protectionism from the 1990s did not extend into more recent periods. The change of policy toward foreign acquirers seems rooted in Court judgments of 2002 and subsequent regulatory reforms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38


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Date posted: October 9, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Aktas, Nihat and de Bodt, Eric and Delanghe, Marieke and Roll, Richard, Market Reactions to European Merger Regulation: A Reexamination of the Protectionism Hypothesis (December 5, 2011). 29th International Conference of the French Finance Association (AFFI) 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2083645 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2083645

Contact Information

Nihat Aktas
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )
Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany
Eric De Bodt (Contact Author)
Université de Lille ( email )
1 place Déliot, BP381
59020 Lille Cedex
France
+03 20 90 74 77 (Phone)
+03 20 90 77 02 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.edebodt.net
Marieke Delanghe
Univ. Lille Nord de France - SKEMA Business School ( email )
Avenue Willy Brandt
Lille, 59777
France
Richard W. Roll
California Institute of Technology ( email )
1200 East California Blvd
Mail Code: 228-77
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
626-395-3890 (Phone)
310-836-3532 (Fax)
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