Concrete Shoes for Competition - The Effect of the German Cement Cartel on Market Price

31 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2012  

Kai Hüschelrath

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Kathrin Mueller

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Tobias Veith

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

We use publicly available price data from the German cement industry to estimate the cartel-induced price increase. We apply two different comparator-based approaches – the ‘before-and-after’ approach and the ‘difference-in-differences’ approach – and especially study the impact of various assumptions on the transition period from the cartel period to the non-cartel period on the overcharge estimate. We find that the cement cartel led to price overcharges in a range from 20.3 to 26.5 percent depending on model approach and model assumptions.

Keywords: Antitrust policy, cartels, private enforcement, damages, overcharge

JEL Classification: L41, L61, K21

Suggested Citation

Hüschelrath, Kai and Mueller, Kathrin and Veith, Tobias, Concrete Shoes for Competition - The Effect of the German Cement Cartel on Market Price (2012). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-035. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2083699 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2083699

Kai Hüschelrath (Contact Author)

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Kathrin Mueller

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Tobias Veith

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

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