31 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2012
Date Written: 2012
We use publicly available price data from the German cement industry to estimate the cartel-induced price increase. We apply two different comparator-based approaches – the ‘before-and-after’ approach and the ‘difference-in-differences’ approach – and especially study the impact of various assumptions on the transition period from the cartel period to the non-cartel period on the overcharge estimate. We find that the cement cartel led to price overcharges in a range from 20.3 to 26.5 percent depending on model approach and model assumptions.
Keywords: Antitrust policy, cartels, private enforcement, damages, overcharge
JEL Classification: L41, L61, K21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hüschelrath, Kai and Mueller, Kathrin and Veith, Tobias, Concrete Shoes for Competition - The Effect of the German Cement Cartel on Market Price (2012). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-035. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2083699 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2083699