Manager-Analyst Conversations in Earnings Conference Calls

48 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2012 Last revised: 13 Nov 2018

See all articles by Jason V. Chen

Jason V. Chen

University of Illinois at Chicago

Venky Nagar

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Jordan Schoenfeld

Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business

Date Written: June 8, 2018

Abstract

Prior research finds that intraday stock prices move considerably during the discussion period of earnings conference calls. In this study, we explore what features of the manager-analyst dialogue during the discussion drive these price movements. We textually analyze the tone of managers and analysts and find that intraday prices react significantly to analyst tone, but not to management tone, for the full duration of the discussion. This effect strengthens when analyst tone is relatively negative. We then present intraday visual evidence that analysts are more neutral than managers over the call and that the tones of both parties drift downward as the call progresses. Overall, our findings illustrate how manager-analyst information exchanges evolve on earnings calls and indicate that analysts are the participants on earnings calls whose comments move stock prices during the discussion.

Keywords: Conference Calls, Corporate Disclosure, Financial Analysts

JEL Classification: G14, G20, D83

Suggested Citation

Chen, Jason V. and Nagar, Venky and Schoenfeld, Jordan, Manager-Analyst Conversations in Earnings Conference Calls (June 8, 2018). Review of Accounting Studies, 2018, 23(4), 1315-1354. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2084488 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2084488

Jason V. Chen

University of Illinois at Chicago ( email )

1200 W Harrison St
Chicago, IL 60607
United States

Venky Nagar

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States
734-647-3292 (Phone)
734-764-3146 (Fax)

Jordan Schoenfeld (Contact Author)

Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business ( email )

3700 O Street, NW
Washington, DC 20057
United States

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