Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2084910
 


 



Debt Renegotiation


Franck Moraux


Université de Rennes I and CREM

Florina Silaghi


Universitat Autònoma Barcelona

June 6, 2012

29th International Conference of the French Finance Association (AFFI) 2012

Abstract:     
This paper develops a new model of debt renegotiation in a structural framework, that accounts for both taxes and bankruptcy costs. We investigate situations where the manager can optimally (on behalf of the equity holder) impose a permanent coupon reduction to creditors, given that the new coupon is chosen such that debt value remains constant. Our result shows that the manager designs the offer as a “take it or leave it” offer and that one can increase the financial value of the firm without hurting the creditors. This model of debt renegotiation can be viewed as a way of passing from a junk bond to an investment grade bond.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: Debt renegotiation, Debt pricing

JEL Classification: G30, G32, G33, G13


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Date posted: November 5, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Moraux, Franck and Silaghi, Florina, Debt Renegotiation (June 6, 2012). 29th International Conference of the French Finance Association (AFFI) 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2084910 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2084910

Contact Information

Franck Moraux (Contact Author)
Université de Rennes I and CREM ( email )
IAE de Rennes
11, rue Jean Macé
Rennes, 35000
France
+33 (0)2 23 23 78 08 (Phone)
+33 (0)2 23 23 78 00 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/franck.moraux/
Florina Silaghi
Universitat Autònoma Barcelona ( email )
Departament d’Empresa, UAB
Bellaterra, Barcelona 08193
Spain
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