De las Superintendencias a las Agencias Regulatorias Independientes en Chile: Aspectos Constitucionales y de Diseño Regulatorio (From 'Superintendencias' to Independent Administrative Agencies in Chile: Constitutional and Institutional Design Aspects)

Actualidad Jurídica (Universidad del Desarrollo), Vol. 22, pp. 263-305, July 2010

43 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2012

See all articles by José Francisco García

José Francisco García

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile - Law Faculty

Sergio Verdugo

IE University - IE Law School

Date Written: July 1, 2010

Abstract

The paper proposes the instauration of a new model for some Chilean administrative agencies (“superintendencias”). The purpose is to fortify their independence from the political branches of Government and to reinforce the technical approach to certain public policy issues. The authors explore the United States debate about independent regulatory agencies and conclude with some useful lessons for Chilean constitutional design.

Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish.

Keywords: Chilean administrative agencies, judicial review of administrative regulation, separation of powers, non delegation doctrine

Suggested Citation

García, José Francisco and Verdugo, Sergio, De las Superintendencias a las Agencias Regulatorias Independientes en Chile: Aspectos Constitucionales y de Diseño Regulatorio (From 'Superintendencias' to Independent Administrative Agencies in Chile: Constitutional and Institutional Design Aspects) (July 1, 2010). Actualidad Jurídica (Universidad del Desarrollo), Vol. 22, pp. 263-305, July 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2084976

José Francisco García

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile - Law Faculty ( email )

Alameda 340
Casa Central
Santiago
Chile

Sergio Verdugo (Contact Author)

IE University - IE Law School ( email )

Madrid
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.ie.edu/law-school/

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