Combinatorial Auction Design for Real-Estate Markets

University of Leuven Department of Decision Sciences and Information Management No. 1209

36 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2012

See all articles by Dries Goossens

Dries Goossens

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL)

Sander Onderstal

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

Frits Spieksma

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL)

Jan Pijnacker

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: June 19, 2012

Abstract

This paper describes a combinatorial auction design for real-estate markets where floor space (in a multi-storeyed building) is to be allocated to various interested parties. Our design is based on lab experiments that provide guidance in choices regarding pricing, feedback, and activity rules. In addition, the allocation needs to satisfy several municipal and building regulations. We show how these regulations can be included in an integer program that is used to solve the winner determination problem, and discuss its computational complexity. Finally, we report on a practical application of this design, where over one hundred bidders took part in the first combinatorial auction for housing space, in a newly erected building in Amsterdam (the Netherlands).

Keywords: combinatorial auction, real estate, auction design, integer programming

Suggested Citation

Goossens, Dries and Onderstal, Sander and Spieksma, Frits and Pijnacker, Jan, Combinatorial Auction Design for Real-Estate Markets (June 19, 2012). University of Leuven Department of Decision Sciences and Information Management No. 1209, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2086351 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2086351

Dries Goossens (Contact Author)

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) ( email )

Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Sander Onderstal

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Frits Spieksma

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) ( email )

Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Jan Pijnacker

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
53
Abstract Views
587
rank
457,038
PlumX Metrics