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Inside-Out Enforcement

PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT, p. 110, Anthony S. Barkow, Rachel E. Barkow, eds., NYU Press, April 2011

23 Pages Posted: 23 Jun 2012  

Lisa Kern Griffin

Duke University School of Law

Date Written: April 18, 2011

Abstract

This chapter for a volume on "Prosecutors in the Boardroom" explores the collaboration between public criminal enforcers and private corporate actors, and some costs and benefits of those partnerships. When the government outsources investigative functions in corporate fraud cases -- such as employee interviews, forensic accounting, and compliance monitoring -- the boundaries between public and private roles can blur. There are advantages to that strategy given resource constraints and the complexity of corporate criminal investigations, but it also tends to exacerbate the piecemeal nature of enforcement. Furthermore, reliance on the private sector imports one of the most problematic features of regulatory relationships into criminal adjudication: the potential for self-dealing.

Keywords: Corporate Crime, Federal Criminal Law, Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Regulatory Enforcement

Suggested Citation

Griffin, Lisa Kern, Inside-Out Enforcement (April 18, 2011). PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT, p. 110, Anthony S. Barkow, Rachel E. Barkow, eds., NYU Press, April 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2087793

Lisa Kern Griffin (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

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