A Reliance Approach to Precedent

Hillel Y. Levin

University of Georgia Law School

June 19, 2012

Why and when should courts presumptively defer to their own past precedents? The doctrine of precedent lies at the core of American jurisprudence and legal practice, but the source of its normative force remains unclear. Consequently, its application is confused and contested.

In this Article, I argue that precedent matters primarily because and to the extent that it generates reliance interests on the part of the public. The Article explores the moral and jurisprudential underpinnings of the reliance approach and considers its far-reaching theoretical and practical implications.

This approach, which has both descriptive and normative features, suggests that we must limit and expand our traditional notions of what qualifies as precedent. More broadly, it upsets what I call the gravitational account of law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: Precedent, Reliance, Theory, Public Law

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: June 19, 2012 ; Last revised: October 2, 2015

Suggested Citation

Levin, Hillel Y., A Reliance Approach to Precedent (June 19, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2087803 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2087803

Contact Information

Hillel Y. Levin (Contact Author)
University of Georgia Law School ( email )
225 Herty Drive
Athens, GA 30602
United States

Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 896
Downloads: 135
Download Rank: 169,630