Common Law and Economic Efficiency

This essay reviews the origins and development of the debate over the “efficiency of the common law hypothesis.” The essay begins with the earliest explanation for the observed tendency of the common law as proffered by Richard Posner. It then examines the Rubin-Priest and contemporary models of demand-side models of common law efficiency and critiques thereof. It then turns to a supply-side analysis of the efficiency of the common law hypothesis, focusing on the nature of the constraints imposed on common law judges and changes in those constraints over time. This essay also examines public choice analysis of the efficiency of the common law and the Austrian economics critique of the standard neoclassical model of analysis.

Keywords: neoclassical arguments, Austrian arguments, Hayek, common law judges, wealth distribution

JEL Classification: B20, B25, B53, K00, K40

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Zywicki, Todd J. and Stringham, Edward Peter, Common Law and Economic Efficiency (June 20, 2012). Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Forthcoming., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2088200 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2088200