Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games

46 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2012

Date Written: June 21, 2012

Abstract

The class of games with one apex player is generalized to the class of games with a collection of apex sets. These simple games, together with a power index, canonically induce a hedonic coalition formation game. A monotonicity property of solutions is introduced and its meaning for the induced hedonic game is analyzed. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of core stable partitions are stated and core stable partitions are characterized.

Keywords: apex games, core stability, hedonic games, strong monotonicity

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Karos, Dominik, Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games (June 21, 2012). FEEM Working Paper No. 38.2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2088768 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2088768

Dominik Karos (Contact Author)

University of Oxford ( email )

Oxford
United Kingdom

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