Unweaving the CESL: Legal-Economic Reason and Institutional Imagination in European Contract Law

18 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2012 Last revised: 19 Nov 2012

See all articles by Chantal Mak

Chantal Mak

University of Amsterdam - Centre for the Study of European Contract Law (CSECL); University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Law

Date Written: June 15, 2012

Abstract

From a law-and-economics perspective, the European Commission’s proposal for the introduction of an optional Common European Sales Law (CESL) has been criticized for over-regulating consumer sales law in Europe and for being likely to yield more costs than benefits. In defense of CESL, it is submitted here that its optional nature may mitigate the risk of over-regulation and provide an opportunity for firms to tailor their activities to consumer preferences in different markets. Furthermore, although the introduction of an optional instrument may increase transaction costs, it does not seem to be excluded that the benefits of increased cross-border trade may (on a long-term basis) outweigh these costs. Finally, in order to evaluate the institutional choices underlying the proposed rules of CESL, and other instruments of European contract law, it is suggested that the further analysis of these rules should take into account the legal-political as well as the legal-economic backdrop to this field of law.

Keywords: common European sales law, European contract law, B2C contracts

JEL Classification: K12

Suggested Citation

Mak, Chantal, Unweaving the CESL: Legal-Economic Reason and Institutional Imagination in European Contract Law (June 15, 2012). Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2012-73; Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series No. 2012-10. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2088777 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2088777

Chantal Mak (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Centre for the Study of European Contract Law (CSECL) ( email )

P.O. Box 1030
Amsterdam, 1000 BA
Netherlands

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Law ( email )

Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

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