Hospital Mergers: The Shift from Federal Antitrust Enforcement to State Regulation

Posted: 29 Feb 2000

See all articles by Erwin A. Blackstone

Erwin A. Blackstone

Temple University - Department of Economics

Joseph P. Fuhr

Widener University - Department of Economics, Finance & Marketing

Abstract

The authors examine and analyze the burgeoning merger activity in the hospital arena, as well as the nonfederal attempts made to regulate that activity. They conclude that the present, ad hoc, system of state regulation is sorely wanting. It would be preferable if stronger antitrust enforcement and judical decisions prevented competition reducing mergers. If a merger results in a true monopoly (and nonetheless passes antitrust scrutiny), its regulation should be the responsibility of the pertinent state public utility board which, unlike the courts and state attorneys general, has sufficient expertise to adequately regulate the merged entities. Otherwise, the faults of the present system, which is easily manipulated by hospitals seeking political and legal cover for their activities, are likely to be perpetuated.

Suggested Citation

Blackstone, Erwin A. and Fuhr, Joseph P., Hospital Mergers: The Shift from Federal Antitrust Enforcement to State Regulation. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=208888

Erwin A. Blackstone

Temple University - Department of Economics ( email )

Fox School of Business and Management
807 Ritter Annex
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
(215) 204-5027 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sbm.temple.edu/~eablacks/

Joseph P. Fuhr (Contact Author)

Widener University - Department of Economics, Finance & Marketing ( email )

One University Place
Chester, PA 19013
United States
610-499-1172 (Phone)

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