The Hayek Hypothesis and Long Run Competitive Equilibrium: An Experimental Investigation

47 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2012

See all articles by Jason Shachat

Jason Shachat

Durham University

Zhenxuan Zhang

Xiamen University - Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE)

Date Written: June 21, 2012

Abstract

We report on an experiment investigating whether the Hayak Hypothesis (Smith, 1982) extends to the long run setting. We consider two environments; one with a common production technology having a U-shaped long run average cost curve and a single competitive equilibrium, and another with a common constant returns to scale technology having a constant long run average cost curve and multiple competitive equilibria. While there is convergence in both environments to the long run equilibrium, it takes longer and is less robust than usually observed in the short run setting. We show that price formation is adaptive and quickly converges to realized short run equilibrium, but long run investment decisions exhibit very limited rationality. We present and estimate an investment choice model that shows that only minimal rationality, coupled with repeated decisions, is enough to achieve high long run allocative efficiency when markets use continuous double auctions.

Keywords: Experiment, Double Auction, Hayek Hypothesis, Long Run Equilibrium, Bounded Rationality

JEL Classification: C92, D41, D01

Suggested Citation

Shachat, Jason and Zhang, Zhenxuan, The Hayek Hypothesis and Long Run Competitive Equilibrium: An Experimental Investigation (June 21, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2089077 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2089077

Jason Shachat (Contact Author)

Durham University ( email )

Durham University Business School
Mill Hill Lane
Durham, Fujian DH1 3LB
United Kingdom

Zhenxuan Zhang

Xiamen University - Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE) ( email )

A 307, Economics Building
Xiamen, Fujian 10246
China

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