Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?

109 Pages Posted: 23 Jun 2012  

Xiaodong Liu

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics

Eleonora Patacchini

Università di Roma "La Sapienza"; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Yves Zenou

Stockholm University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Lung-Fei Lee

Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 22, 2012

Abstract

We analyze delinquent networks of adolescents in the United States. We develop a dynamic network formation model showing who the key player is, i.e. the criminal who once removed generates the highest possible reduction in aggregate crime level. We then structurally estimate our model using data on criminal behaviors of adolescents in the United States (AddHealth data). Compared to other criminals, key players are more likely to be male, have less educated parents, are less attached to religion and feel socially more excluded. We also find that, even though some criminals are not very active in criminal activities, they can be key players because they have a crucial position in the network in terms of betweenness centrality.

Keywords: Crime, Bonacich Centrality, Dynamic Network Formation, Crime Policies

JEL Classification: A14, D85, K42, Z13

Suggested Citation

Liu, Xiaodong and Patacchini, Eleonora and Zenou, Yves and Lee, Lung-Fei, Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player? (June 22, 2012). FEEM Working Paper No. 39.2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2089267 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2089267

Xiaodong Liu

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics ( email )

Campus Box 256
Boulder, CO 80309
United States

HOME PAGE: http://spot.colorado.edu/~xiaodong/

Eleonora Patacchini

Università di Roma "La Sapienza" ( email )

Box 83 - RM62
P. le A. Moro 5
Roma I-00185
Italy
+39 06 4991 0843 (Phone)
+39 06 4453 246 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

Yves Zenou (Contact Author)

Stockholm University ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) ( email )

P.O. Box 5501
S-114 85 Stockholm
Sweden

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Lung-Fei Lee

Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics ( email )

410 Arps Hall
1945 N. High St.
Columbus, OH 43210-1172
United States

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