Power in a Theory of the Firm

45 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 1997

See all articles by Luigi Zingales

Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Raghuram G. Rajan

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; International Monetary Fund (IMF); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 1996

Abstract

What determines the boundaries of a firm? Is a firm defined solely by the ownership of physical assets as suggested by the property rights theory? This paper presents a theory of the firm based on the well-known idea that the firm improves over the market because it uses ex ante mechanisms to enhance specific investments. Maintaining the contractability assumptions of the property rights view, however, we identify not one but two such mechanisms. One is, of course, the ownership of property rights. Our contribution here is to highlight the costs of this mechanism which has been underemphasized. The second is the access agents have to the scarce resources, be they physical assets or human capital, that are needed for the production process. The theory enables us to address a number of issues including the separation of ownership and control, the importance of organizational design, and the rationale for the division of labor.

JEL Classification: G30

Suggested Citation

Zingales, Luigi and Rajan, Raghuram G., Power in a Theory of the Firm (November 1996). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2091 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2091

Luigi Zingales (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-3196 (Phone)
773-834-2081 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Raghuram G. Rajan

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-4437 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
773-702-9299 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)