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The Corporate Governance Roles of Information Quality and Corporate Takeovers

Jing Li

The University of Hong Kong - School of Business

Lin Nan

Purdue University

Ran Zhao

Chapman University

November 12, 2014

We examine the corporate governance roles of firms' information quality and the takeover market in disciplining management. Increasing the information quality improves the takeover efficiency, but highly efficient takeover market also discourages the manager from working hard. We find that perfect information quality is not optimal for either the current shareholders' expected payoff maximization or the expected firm value maximization. The current shareholders' choice of information quality is different from the information quality level that maximizes the expected firm value, as the current shareholders only obtain a share of the value enhancement from a successful takeover, and moreover, the current shareholders also obtain an overbidding premium when the acquirer overbids for a low value firm. We also analyze the impact of antitakeover laws on firms' endogenous information quality as well as on the current shareholders' welfare and the firm value. We find that the expected firm value may increase after the adoption of antitakeover laws when the current shareholders are able to adjust their choice of information quality. This happens when the current shareholders increase the information quality in response to antitakeover laws.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 62

Keywords: Corporate takeovers, Information quality, Antitakeover law, Takeover efficiency

JEL Classification: G34, G38, M41

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Date posted: June 25, 2012 ; Last revised: November 13, 2014

Suggested Citation

Li, Jing and Nan, Lin and Zhao, Ran, The Corporate Governance Roles of Information Quality and Corporate Takeovers (November 12, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2091619 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2091619

Contact Information

Jing Li (Contact Author)
The University of Hong Kong - School of Business ( email )
Meng Wah Complex
Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
Lin Nan
Purdue University ( email )
1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
7654944438 (Phone)
Ran Zhao
Chapman University ( email )
Orange, CA 92866
United States
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References:  26
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