Agencies on the Loose? Holding Government Networks Accountable

A revised version of this working paper is in a book on Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation based on a symposium held a Columbia Law School in April 1999, edited by George Bermann and Peter Lindseth.

57 Pages Posted: 15 Feb 2000

See all articles by Anne-Marie Slaughter

Anne-Marie Slaughter

Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

Date Written: 1999

Abstract

An important but often overlooked mechanism of global governance is networks of national government officials working together on issues of common interest and concern. These "government networks" are particularly dense in a number of regulatory areas such as monetary policy, securities regulation, insurance regulation, competition policy, and environmental policy. While many welcome the growth of these networks under the banner of transnational regulatory cooperation, others perceive a threat of unaccountable technocracy ? agencies on the loose. This paper sets forth the accountability critique and then develops a number of responses, including increasing transparency through use of the Internet, increasing opportunity for participation in network activities, and distinguishing between real and perceived problems of accountability. In conclusion, the paper sets forth several general principles of transnational governance that would provide a baseline for regulating all transgovernmental activity.

JEL Classification: K33

Suggested Citation

Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Agencies on the Loose? Holding Government Networks Accountable (1999). A revised version of this working paper is in a book on Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation based on a symposium held a Columbia Law School in April 1999, edited by George Bermann and Peter Lindseth.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=209319 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.209319

Anne-Marie Slaughter (Contact Author)

Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs ( email )

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States
609-258-4800 (Phone)

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