Some Observations Concerning Multi-Jurisdictional Tax Competition

33 Pages Posted: 15 Feb 2000

See all articles by Daniel Shaviro

Daniel Shaviro

New York University School of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2000

Abstract

Should (or when should) separate governments, including sub-units in a federal system, be encouraged to engage in tax competition rather than harmonizing their tax systems? The question is akin to asking when government should be used to solve collective action problems through coercion, and thus has no uniform answer. The paper discusses tariff examples where harmonization is preferable, Tiebout examples where competition is preferable, and then assesses the collision of these two lines of analysis with respect to tax haven and holiday jurisdictions that offer outside businesses or passive investors more favorable tax terms than those available to the locals.

JEL Classification: H00, H25, H41, H71, H73, H87, K34

Suggested Citation

Shaviro, Daniel, Some Observations Concerning Multi-Jurisdictional Tax Competition (2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=209428 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.209428

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