Reflections on the End of History for Corporate Law

Convergence of Corporate Governance: Promise and Prospects, Abdul Rasheed and Toru Yoshikawa, eds., Palgrave-MacMillan, 2012

Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 449

16 Pages Posted: 28 Jun 2012 Last revised: 31 Jul 2012

See all articles by Henry Hansmann

Henry Hansmann

Yale University - Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Reinier Kraakman

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute

Date Written: August 15, 2011

Abstract

Our essay on The End of History for Corporate Law was originally written for a conference at Columbia University in 1997 that was organized to address a question that was then just beginning to attract substantial attention: “Are Corporate Governance Systems Converging?” There can of course be as many answers to that question as there are interpretations of the question itself. At a macro level, however, it seemed to us that there was an important sense in which the answer to this question was clearly "yes." In our essay -- with its hyperbolic title and somewhat more modulated text -- we sought to expound that view. We now ask whether, 15 years after the End of History essay was written, the claims it makes still hold up.

Keywords: corporate governance, convergence

JEL Classification: G38, K22, P12

Suggested Citation

Hansmann, Henry and Kraakman, Reinier H., Reflections on the End of History for Corporate Law (August 15, 2011). Convergence of Corporate Governance: Promise and Prospects, Abdul Rasheed and Toru Yoshikawa, eds., Palgrave-MacMillan, 2012, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 449, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2095419

Henry Hansmann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 208215
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203-432-7101 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
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HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Reinier H. Kraakman

Harvard Law School ( email )

1575 Massachusetts
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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-3586 (Phone)
617-496-6118 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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