Do CEOs of State-Owned Enterprises Matter? Evidence from Brazil, 1973-1993

40 Pages Posted: 30 Jun 2012

See all articles by Aldo Musacchio

Aldo Musacchio

Brandeis University- International Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research

Sérgio G. Lazzarini

Insper Institute of Education and Research

Claudia Bruschi

Date Written: June 26, 2012

Abstract

We study if CEOs and their backgrounds matter for the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) exploiting the fact that these companies had different CEOs (with different backgrounds) in different moments in time. We construct a database of Brazilian SOEs between 1973 and 1993 and make three tests. First, we use variance decomposition to study CEO effects. Second, we look at how much of the variation in performance can be explained by CEOs who switch companies. Third, we test if CEO background and ability matter for performance. We find sizable effects of CEOs on performance, especially for military managers and those who attended top universities.

Keywords: State-owned enterprises, CEOs, military CEOs, bureaucrats, state capitalism

JEL Classification: M51, P51, L33, P27, N56, D22

Suggested Citation

Musacchio, Aldo and Lazzarini, Sérgio Giovanetti and Bruschi, Claudia, Do CEOs of State-Owned Enterprises Matter? Evidence from Brazil, 1973-1993 (June 26, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2096210 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2096210

Aldo Musacchio (Contact Author)

Brandeis University- International Business School ( email )

415 South Street MC 32
Waltham, MA 02454-9110
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.nber.org/people/aldo_musacchio

Sérgio Giovanetti Lazzarini

Insper Institute of Education and Research ( email )

R Quata 300
Sao Paulo, 04542-030
Brazil
55-11-45042387 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sergiolazzarini.insper.edu.br/indexelazza.html

No contact information is available for Claudia Bruschi

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