Judicial Review and Political Partisanship: Moving from Consensual to Majoritarian Democracy

41 Pages Posted: 1 Jul 2012 Last revised: 18 Apr 2015

See all articles by Nuno Garoupa

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Veronica Grembi

University of Milan - Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods (DEMM)

Date Written: March 1, 2015

Abstract

Due to the collapse of the party system during the mid-nineties, Italy represents an interesting case study to test the effects of a transition from a consensual to a majoritarian model of democracy on judicial behavior at the level of the Constitutional Court. Using a dataset of 972 cases of substantive judicial review (ricorsi in via principale} from 1985 to 2005, and proposing new measures of political alignment within constitutional review, we analyze the effect of a change in the political party system on judicial behavior. Our results show that political alignment is a stronger predictor of judicial decision making under majoritarian than consensual model of democracy.

Keywords: Party Systems, Judicial Behavior, Italian Constitutional Court, Judicial Politics

JEL Classification: K0

Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno and Grembi, Veronica, Judicial Review and Political Partisanship: Moving from Consensual to Majoritarian Democracy (March 1, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097259 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2097259

Nuno Garoupa (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Veronica Grembi

University of Milan - Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods (DEMM) ( email )

Via Conservatorio, 7
Milan, 20122
Italy

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