Lord Mustill and the Courts of Tennis – Dallah V Pakistan in England, France and Utopia

16 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2012

See all articles by Jan Kleinheisterkamp

Jan Kleinheisterkamp

London School of Economics - Law School; Cornell University - Law School

Date Written: July 2012

Abstract

This note analyses the reasoning of the English and French courts in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan, in which an arbitral tribunal had accepted jurisdiction over the Government of Pakistan on the basis of an arbitration agreement concluded by a trust that was created, controlled, and then extinguished by the Government. It highlights the English courts' clarifications on the degree to which arbitral awards should benefit from the presumption of validity at the stage of enforcement and discusses how the cultural background of the English and French judges – and of the arbitrators – drove them to come to contradictory results. Moreover, it argues that both judges and arbitrators, owing to the way the parties framed their arguments, probably missed the proper solution of the case.

Keywords: arbitration, international, jurisdiction of arbitrators, court scrutiny of, transnational law, enforcement of awards, New York Convention

Suggested Citation

Kleinheisterkamp, Jan, Lord Mustill and the Courts of Tennis – Dallah V Pakistan in England, France and Utopia (July 2012). The Modern Law Review, Vol. 75, Issue 4, pp. 639-654, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2098394 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2012.00918.x

Jan Kleinheisterkamp (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Law School ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff/jan-kleinheisterkamp.htm

Cornell University - Law School ( email )

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Cornell University
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United States

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