Gender Differences in Experimental Wage Negotiations

19 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2012

See all articles by Marcus Dittrich

Marcus Dittrich

Deggendorf Institute of Technology; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Andreas Knabe

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg - Institute of Economics and Business Administration; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Kristina Leipold

Dresden University of Technology

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 29, 2012

Abstract

We examine behavioral gender differences and gender pairing effects in a laboratory experiment with face-to-face alternating-offers wage bargaining. Our results suggest that male players are able to obtain better bargaining outcomes than female players. Male employees get higher wages than female employees. Male employers pay lower wages to female employees than female employers pay to male employees. Moreover, we find gender differences in the first offers of the bargaining game.

Keywords: gender differences, wage bargaining, labor market experiment

JEL Classification: C720, C910, J160

Suggested Citation

Dittrich, Marcus and Knabe, Andreas and Leipold, Kristina, Gender Differences in Experimental Wage Negotiations (June 29, 2012). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3862. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2098874

Marcus Dittrich (Contact Author)

Deggendorf Institute of Technology ( email )

Edlmairstraße 6 und 8
Deggendorf, Bavaria 94469
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Andreas Knabe

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg - Institute of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Universitaetsplatz 2
Magdeburg, 39016
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Kristina Leipold

Dresden University of Technology ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
Dresden, 01062
Germany

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