Prosecutor Elections, Mistakes, and Appeals

23 Pages Posted: 4 Jul 2012  

Bryan C. McCannon

West Virginia University - College of Business & Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 3, 2012

Abstract

Public prosecutors exercise a significant amount of discretion in the criminal justice system. In the U.S. the dominant form of accountability is that prosecutors must be re-elected by the voters. Recent empirical work illustrates that election concerns open up the potential for distortion in the decisionmaking of prosecutors. Specifically, it has been shown that prosecutors take more cases to trial and plea bargain less when running for re-election. This effect is magnified when the incumbent is challenged. Does this hawkish behavior of prosecutors lead to inaccuracies in the criminal justice system? A panel data set of appellate decisions in western New York is analyzed. It is shown that if the initial felony conviction takes place in the six months prior to a re-election and is appealed, then the probability the appellate court upholds the lower court’s decision decreases by 5.1-7.1 percentage points. Thus, the popular election of prosecutors results in inaccurate sentences and wrongful convictions.

Keywords: appeal, election, prosecutor

JEL Classification: K42, H11, D72

Suggested Citation

McCannon, Bryan C., Prosecutor Elections, Mistakes, and Appeals (July 3, 2012). 7th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2099730 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2099730

Bryan C. McCannon (Contact Author)

West Virginia University - College of Business & Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6025
Morgantown, WV 26506
United States

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