Power, National Security and Transparency: Judicial Decision Making and Social Architecture in the Federal Courts

Abstract

Even in a democratic society, the need for transparency must be balanced with an important countervailing interest: the occasional, legitimate need for government secrecy. This article, based on an examination of opinions in federal cases dealing with national security and transparency, explores how judges identified the main legal issues presented by a case and the legal factors or mode of legal interpretation used to reach or justify their conclusions. The article concludes that many of these opinions are as much about judges’ attempts to balance the judicial branch’s power with the powers of the executive and legislative branches as they are about national security and transparency. Furthermore, the article contends these opinions have created an “architecture of power” that determines how national security information is controlled. The final section also suggests that judges should be mindful of the original architecture of power established by the Constitution and the First Amendment when writing their opinions.

Keywords: First Amendment, social architecture theory, national security law, seperation of powers